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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Eventi DIAG
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20181028T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
RDATE:20191027T030000
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DTSTART:20190331T020000
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UID:calendar.18154.field_data.0@dis.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20230602T085852Z
CREATED:20190325T225731Z
DESCRIPTION:We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theor
y\, in which a principal designs an outcome- dependent compensation scheme
to incentivize an agent to take a costly and unobservable action. When al
l of the model parameters—including the full distribution over principal r
ewards resulting from each agent action—are known to the designer\, an opt
imal contract can in principle be computed by linear programming. In addit
ion to their demanding informational requirements\, such optimal contracts
are often complex and unintuitive\, and do not resemble contracts used in
practice. This paper examines contract theory through the theoretical com
puter science lens\, with the goal of developing novel theory to explain a
nd justify the prevalence of relatively simple contracts\, such as linear
(pure commission) contracts. First\, we consider the case where the princi
pal knows only the rst moment of each action’s reward distribution\, and w
e prove that linear contracts are guaranteed to be worst-case optimal\, ra
nging over all reward distributions consistent with the given moments. Sec
ond\, we study linear contracts from a worst-case approximation perspectiv
e\, and prove several tight parameterized approximation bounds. Joint work
with Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-CohenPreprint: https://arxiv.org/ab
s/1808.03713Speaker: Paul Duetting - http://paulduetting.com/
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190329T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190329T120000
LAST-MODIFIED:20200528T082426Z
LOCATION:DIAG - Via Ariosto 25\, Room B203
SUMMARY:Simple versus Optimal Contracts - Paul Duetting (London School of E
conomics)
URL;TYPE=URI:https://dis.uniroma1.it/node/18154
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